The Surface Laplacian Technique in EEG: Theory and Methods

This paper reviews the method of surface Laplacian differentiation to study EEG. We focus on topics that are helpful for a clear understanding of the underlying concepts and its efficient implementation, which is especially important for EEG researchers unfamiliar with the technique. The popular methods of finite difference and splines are reviewed in detail. The former has the advantage of simplicity and low computational cost, but its estimates are prone to a variety of errors due to discretization. The latter eliminates all issues related to discretization and incorporates a regularization mechanism to reduce spatial noise, but at the cost of increasing mathematical and computational complexity. These and several others issues deserving further development are highlighted, some of which we address to the extent possible. Here we develop a set of discrete approximations for Laplacian estimates at peripheral electrodes and a possible solution to the problem of multiple-frame regularization. We also provide the mathematical details of finite difference approximations that are missing in the literature, and discuss the problem of computational performance, which is particularly important in the context of EEG splines where data sets can be very large. Along this line, the matrix representation of the surface Laplacian operator is carefully discussed and some figures are given illustrating the advantages of this approach. In the final remarks, we briefly sketch a possible way to incorporate finite-size electrodes into Laplacian estimates that could guide further developments.Comment: 43 pages, 8 figure

Contextuality in the Integrated Information Theory

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is one of the most influential theories of consciousness, mainly due to its claim of mathematically formalizing consciousness in a measurable way. However, the theory, as it is formulated, does not account for contextual observations that are crucial for understanding consciousness. Here we put forth three possible difficulties for its current version, which could be interpreted as a trilemma. Either consciousness is contextual or not. If contextual, either IIT needs revisions to its axioms to include contextuality, or it is inconsistent. If consciousness is not contextual, then IIT faces an empirical challenge. Therefore, we argue that IIT in its current version is inadequate